Credit growth in emerging Europe : a cause for stability concerns? by Sirtaine, Sophie & Skamnelos, Ilias
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4281
Credit Growth in Emerging Europe




Europe and Central Asia Region


















































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4281
High credit growth in Emerging Europe, generally 
considered a sign of catching-up with the “old” Europe, 
has begun receiving considerable attention among 
investors and policymakers alike. Given heightened 
global risks and the demands under the European Union 
accession process, the need to better understand this 
high credit growth’s drivers, riskiness, and the possible 
macroeconomic and financial stability consequences 
is strong. The authors adopt a holistic approach in 
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reviewing the rapid credit growth experienced in the 
region, examining macroeconomic, financial sector, 
corporate sector, and asset market consequences and 
possible vulnerabilities. They consider three possible 
scenarios—a catching-up with older European countries, 
a soft landing as experienced by Portugal in the early 
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  2 
Introduction 
 
Real GDP growth among the Emerging European Countries
2 has been strong since 2000, 
reaching an average of over 5 percent p.a. over the period 2000-2005. This has been the 
signature of the economic recovery of the transition to a market economy. The growth 
forecasts are also optimistic as Table 1 suggests. However, prior to this period of 
sustained growth, most countries in the region suffered episodes of sharp GDP decline. 
These were due to macroeconomic imbalances, policy uncertainty and, notably, financial 
crises. The degree to which such a reversal could reoccur, especially in view of the rapid 
credit growth currently experienced, is the central topic of this paper. 
 
Table 1: Macroeconomic forecasts for 2007 as of Nov. 2006 
  Real GDP Growth  S&P Credit Rating 
Baltic countries  7.5  A(S) to A-(S) 
Central Eastern European countries  4.7  A(P) to BBB+(N) 
South Eastern European countries  5.1  BBB+ (S) to BBB- (P) 
Source: Consensus Economics, S&P 
Note: S&P credit watch in brackets, P=positive, N=negative, N=neutral 
 
High credit growth in Emerging Europe, generally considered a sign of catching-up with 
the “old” Europe, has begun receiving considerable attention among investors and policy 
makers alike. With the memory of the Asian financial crisis and financial contagion of 
1997-98 still fresh, investors’ and international financial institutions’ publications exhibit 
some nervousness and reflect this with a growing focus on vulnerability indicators.
3 
Meanwhile, publications by central banks in the region focus on the difficult balancing 
act between financial deepening and unsustainable credit growth.
4 Given heightened 
global risks and the demands under the European Union accession process, the need to 
better understand the drivers of credit growth in Emerging Europe, its riskiness and the 
possible macro and financial stability consequences is strong. 
 
As will be developed in the paper, the rapid credit growth experienced by most Emerging 
European Countries has indeed led to the development of relatively large macroeconomic 
imbalances in many of these countries. In particular, the credit-fueled domestic demand 
upsurge has contributed to the deterioration of external current account balances and 
exerted upward pressure on asset, goods and labor market prices. In particular, the rapid 
increase in household credit has created vulnerabilities in the property market. Under 
fixed exchange rate regimes or with limited margins to intervene in the foreign exchange 
                                                 
2 By Emerging Europe and Emerging European countries we refer in this study to the Baltic countries of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the Central Eastern European countries of the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia and the South Eastern European countries of Bulgaria, Croatia and 
Romania. 
3 For example, ING (2006) ‘Thai with a twist’, Danske Bank (2006) ‘Be careful! Risk on the rise’, or 
cautionary reports by the IMF (WEO, 2004) and the ECB (Papademos, 2005). 
4 The importance of financial deepening towards growth has received a lot of attention recently with studies 
such as Levine et al (2000). However, many studies point to financial distress associated with rapid credit 
expansion, such as Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). This raises the policy-related balance dilemma of credit 
growth benefiting the real economy versus credit boom building up macroeconomic imbalances. 
  3market, the rise in domestic prices can reduce external competitiveness and lead to 
devaluation pressures. Furthermore, as the current credit expansion is largely financed by 
foreign exchange flows, it raises concerns about currency mismatches, sudden stops and 
financial contagion. 
 
Irrespectively of these macroeconomic imbalances, rapid credit growth can often be 
considered risky in itself. Euphoria-led credit booms have indeed often led banks to 
increasingly focus and reassign staff to the generation of new loans to the detriment of 
credit origination, monitoring and risk appraisal. As a result, credit booms have 
frequently been associated with future increases in non-performing loans (NPLs) and 
banking sector problems. In fact, high credit growth is considered an early warning 
indicator of future potential banking sector problems. 
 
We attempt to examine these concerns by focusing on the banking sector’s health and 
riskiness, but, nevertheless, taking a holistic approach and assessing the macroeconomic, 
financial and corporate sector conditions and their interrelations. The analysis is based on 
macroeconomic trends established from widely available sources and bank level data 
from BankScope. Benchmarks for comparisons are set against Euro Area countries 
(Portugal in particular) and Asian countries on the eve of the 1997 crisis. 
 
The study is organized as follows: in Section 1, we briefly review the relevant literature; 
in Section 2, we review the rapid credit growth experienced by the Emerging European 
Countries in recent years; in Section 3, we examine macroeconomic, financial sector, 
corporate sector and asset market consequences and possible vulnerabilities; in Section 3, 
we examine three possible scenarios, a catching-up with older European countries, a soft 
landing as experienced by Portugal in the early 2000s, and a hard landing as experienced 
by Asia in 1997; and in Section 4, we conclude and make policy recommendations. 
 
Section 1: Brief Literature Review 
 
A number of literature strands are relevant to this study. The vulnerability indicator 
literature motivates us to conduct a holistic analysis of the macro-economy, the banking 
and the corporate sectors. The existing literature on credit expansion in the region offers 
inconclusive evidence on the catching-up theory and the degree of regional vulnerability. 
Finally, the literature related to financial crises (in East Asia in particular) offers insights 
on possible hard landing scenarios. 
 
A common concern about economies under stress is that problems in one sector can 
spread to others.
  5 This concern has naturally also been identified in the vulnerability 
indicators and the Early Warning Systems (EWSs) literature, which attempts to identify 
the causes of financial crises and determine early warning indicators. Interestingly, three 
prominent approaches have emerged. The macroeconomic approach, for example in 
                                                 
5 The Financial Soundness Indicators (IMF, 2004) include indicators of capital adequacy, asset quality, 
profitability, liquidity and exposure to foreign exchange risk applied to the financial sector. The IMF 
nevertheless also considers more general financial vulnerability indicators related to the macroeconomy 
and global risk factors, as well as to corporate and household indebtedness, asset price inflation, contagion 
and qualitative factors (regulation, supervision, financial institution management). 
  4Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), considers crises to be the result of 
macroeconomic imbalances, mostly external position fragilities, and highlights the need 
to monitor macroprudential indicators. On the other hand, the bank balance sheet 
approach of Sahajwala and Van den Berg (2000) sees crises as resulting from poor 
banking practices and stresses the need to monitor the banking sector’s health and 
conduct stress tests to assess its vulnerability.
6 Finally, the market approach developed 
in studies such as that of Bongini et al (2002) turns to market indicators, like equity and 
debt prices, to extract a probability of default, resulting from corporate, household and 
real estate sector fragilities. 
 
Turning to the literature on credit growth in Emerging Europe, the emphasis has been on 
bench marking to an estimated equilibrium level of credit growth or identifying 
deviations from trends, with mixed results but with the emphasis always on vigilance.
7 
Keeping in mind different approaches, time periods, country and topic focuses, Schadler 
et al (2004), Cotarelli et al. (2005) and Brzoza-Brzezina (2005) consider the current trend 
a benign scenario of catching up with a largely remote possibility of a downward 
correction. On the other hand, others find the current credit growth excessive in some 
countries and see possible stability issues, with Backé et al (2005) pointing out 
vulnerabilities in Croatia, Estonia, Latvia and possibly Bulgaria, Boissay et al. (2006) 
Croatia, Estonia, Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania, Kiss et al (2005) Latvia and Estonia and 
Duenwald et al. (2005) Bulgaria and Romania. Finally, Ko (2006) and Watson (2006) 
consider different possible scenarios, including a slow correction scenario, with 
misaligned income expectations, a slow supply response in non-traded goods and 
unsound fiscal policies as major distress triggers. 
 
Turning to the financial crisis literature, two originating factors have been stressed: 
weaknesses in fundamentals (whether in the macroeconomic, financial, corporate, or 
housing sectors) and panics (market overreaction, herding).
8 The studies following the 
East Asian financial crisis reflect this dichotomy of views as well.
9 Thus, despite 
consensus on the crisis consequences, the causes of the crisis are still debated. Some 
characteristics of the Asian crisis are particularly interesting for this study: i) the sudden 
reversal of capital flows; ii) the occurrence of twin crises and the central importance of 
the banking sector; iii) the power of contagion; and, surprisingly, iv) the failure of the 
financial turmoil to be predicted or explained by traditional crisis models. 
 
                                                 
6 The literature on stress testing has also adopted a broad approach to the origin of shocks, ranging from 
macroeconomic factors to corporate balance sheets. 
7 But, as pointed out in Gourinchas et al (2001), although the conditional probability of a lending boom 
occurring before a banking crisis may be quite high, it does not tell us much about the converse. In that 
respect, the synergy of fragilities at the macro, financial and corporate levels becomes central. 
8 This is also reflected in the literature on contagion, split into rational (linkages of fundamentals) and 
irrational (herding, euphoria, panic). 
9 Radelet and Sachs (1999) identify four main types of models to explain the crisis: weaknesses in the 
economies, moral hazard, panic following the Thai devaluation and self-fulfilling panic by investors. 
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Section 2: Credit Growth in Emerging Europe 
 
The region’s economic convergence has had important financial spillovers, leading 
to a strengthening and deepening of the financial sectors through, among others, (i) an 
increased presence of foreign banks, (ii) an alignment of legal and regulatory frameworks 
to EU guidelines, and (iii) an alignment of supervisory practices with EU practices. Since 
2000, abundant liquidity has fed an upsurge in financial activity translating into a rapid 
rise in bank credit, surging stock markets and a booming real estate sector (see Box 1 on 
the drivers of credit growth in the Emerging European Countries). 
  Figure 1: Structure of the financial sector in the EU8 
countries (1996-2002) 
 
Bank credit is of particular 
importance given that the 
financial systems of the region are 
bank-centric, with bank assets 
making up about 85 percent of 
financial sector assets
10 (see Figure 
1), while there is relatively limited 
development of the capital markets 
and other non-bank finance 
institutions (NBFIs). 
 

































Over the last decade, bank lending 
to the private sector in the 
Emerging European Countries has 
been growing at an average annual 
compounded growth rate of 24 
percent p.a. (from 1993 to 2005 –
Figure 2), led by a particularly 
strong and sustained growth in 
Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia and 
Lithuania. In the last few years, 
credit growth has continued to 
accelerate in the Baltic countries 
(reaching annual growth rates of 
nearly 60 percent in Latvia and 
Lithuania in 2005) and in Bulgaria 
(reaching nearly 45 percent in 2005). 
Credit growth has been notably lower in the central Eastern European counties, especially 
in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (where it averaged 5 and 6 percent p.a. respectively). 
 
                                                 
10 In addition, banking sectors are often bi-modal, with few large banks and many small ones. 
  6 
 
Box 1: The drivers of Credit Growth in the EU10 Countries 
 
The fast credit growth observed in the EU10 countries has been led by various factors affecting the 
supply and the demand for credit, as well as by favorable macroeconomic conditions and specific 
government policies. 
 
Firstly, there has been an increase in the supply of bank loans driven primarily by the convergence-
motivated financial sector deepening. The large privatization processes in the late 1990s and early 
2000s in the banking sector and public sector retrenchment from banking have been key factors 
removing previous crowding out and inefficiency effects. Increased competition among banks (as a 
result of foreign entry into the market to capture market share in countries with favorable growth and 
return conditions compared to their home countries) has led to narrowing margins and higher credit 
growth to maintain profitability. The large inflows of foreign financing (resulting from the then lower 
domestic macroeconomic risks, currency appreciation expectations, as well as external factors like low 
real international interest rates and abundant liquidity) has also stimulated the rise in credit supply. 
Finally, credit activities have been supported by the development of credit information bureaus, 
collateral regimes, improved creditors’ rights and insolvency frameworks, stronger judiciary systems,  
better accounting and auditing practices, and new banking products. 
 
Secondly, the demand for credit has grown under the impact of improving macroeconomic conditions  
(like falling inflation, lower interest rates and predictable exchange rates), low initial household 
indebtedness, increases in disposable income, rising income expectations (driven by catching-up 
expectations and higher confidence), better investment opportunities, and possibly some speculative 
investments. The demand for credit has also been pushed by foreign interests investing and borrowing 
in the region (such as the acquisition of real estate assets by Russian investors in the Baltic countries). 
 
Thirdly, macroeconomic conditions in the EU10 countries have been favorable for credit expansion, 
including successful disinflation, good economic prospects and a positive business cycle, low real 
interest rate levels and a real exchange rate appreciation. In some countries, easy monetary and/or fiscal 
policies have also contributed to strong growth in bank credit. 
 
Fourthly, specific government schemes may have also contributed to some of the observed credit 
growth, such as construction saving subsidies (in the Czech Republic and Hungary) and interest rate 
subsidies (in Hungary), favorable tax treatment for housing loans and government bail-out guarantees 
(implicit or explicit). For instance, in Estonia, mortgage finance has been stimulated by guarantees 
available from KredEX, the government credit and export fund and the tax deductibility of mortgage 
interests. 
 
The main reasons suggested above are also the main determinants of credit according to the 
macroeconomic literature estimating equilibrium levels for credit growth in the EU10, such as in 
Cotarelli et al (2005), Backe et al (2005), Boissay et al (2006) and Kiss et al (2006). They find among 
the key determinants of credit: GDP per capita (economic growth), the real interest rate (credit cost), 
inflation (volatility cost and credit constraint), public debt (crowding out), financial liberalization 
indices (financial deepening), banking regulation, accounting standards and property prices (wealth 
effect, collateral). Nevertheless, the literature also suggests that country-specific effects have also 
played a large role. 
 
The rapid growth observed in the Emerging European Countries has translated into 
a sharp increase in the ratio of credit to GDP (see Figure 3), with the exception of the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Romania, for which this ratio has been modest or 
declining (but they are showing signs of a possible renewed upsurge). 
  7 



















































Credit growth has resulted mostly 
from loans to households while 
growth in corporate sector loans has 
remained modest (Figure 4). As a 
result, the share of consumer and 
mortgage loans in banks’ portfolios 
has increased significantly in all 
countries (except in Slovenia, where it 
has remained stable) (Figure 5). Only 
in Slovenia has the growth in 
corporate sector loans surpassed that 
of consumer loans. 
Figure 4: Individual and corporate credit growth 























Figure 5: Evolution of Loan Portfolio Breakdowns 












Loans to households Loans to corporate Other loans
Croatia Latvia Estonia Lithuania Czech Rep. Slovenia Hungary Poland
 
Source: national central banks 
Among loans to individuals, housing 
loans have been growing 
particularly fast. Between 2004 and 
2005 alone, housing loans have 
increased by more than 95 percent in 
the Czech Republic, 45 percent in 
Slovakia and Poland and 25 percent in 
Estonia, Latvia and Hungary. In Latvia 
and Estonia, total real estate loans 
outstanding (including mortgages and 
real estate sector loans) accounted for 
over 50 percent of total outstanding 
loans at the end of 2005.  
 
By contrast, loans to the corporate sector have grown at modest pace in the region 
(except for the Baltic countries and Slovenia). Among the reasons behind this trend are 
the scarcity of financially viable opportunities in industrial sectors, remaining weaknesses 
in corporate bankruptcy procedures and contract enforcement (see Table 2), opacity of 
information on enterprises (especially SMEs), low corporate investment and borrowing 
needs after a cycle of stock building and operations under full production capacity, a 
large reliance on suppliers’ financing and intra-company loans, and a more selective 
approach to corporate lending brought about by better credit practices and regulations. 
The low growth in corporate sector loans raises questions on the productive impact of the 
  8observed credit growth, which has fueled large increases in consumption and imports, as 
explained in the next section. 
 
Table 2  Selected Doing Business indicators, Emerging European Countries, 2006 
Closing a Business (2006) Enforcing Contracts (2006)
Time 
(years)
Cost (% of 
estate)
Recovery rate (cents 
on the dollar)
Procedures 
(number) Time (days) Cost (% of debt)
OECD 1.4 7.1 74 22.2 351.2 11.2
Europe & Central Asia 3.5 14.3 29.5 31.5 408.8 15
Estonia 3 9 39.9 25 275 11.5
Latvia 3 13 34.8 21 240 11.8
Lithuania 1.7 7 50.5 24 166 8.6
Czech Republic 9.2 14.5 18.5 21 820 14.1
Hungary 2 14.5 39.7 21 335 9.6
Poland 3 22 27.9 41 980 10
Slovakia 4 18 48.1 27 565 15.7
Slovenia 2 8 44.9 25 1350 15.2
Bulgaria 3.3 9 34.4 34 440 14
Croatia 3.1 14.5 28.9 22 561 10
Romania 4.6 9 19.9 43 335 10.7  
Source: Doing Business (2006) - See www.doingbusiness.org
 
 
Section 3: Macroeconomic, Financial Sector and Asset Market Vulnerabilities 
 
A.  Macro Imbalances and Potential Vulnerabilities
11
 
The high credit growth experienced by many of the Emerging European Countries 
has had important macroeconomic consequences, primarily through a sharp boost on 
their domestic demand (see Table 3). We look in this chapter at the main macroeconomic 
variables, their interaction with the credit expansion and the possible risks they present. 
 
Overall, the recent economic performance of the Emerging European Countries has 
been remarkable.
  They have successfully managed their transition from centrally-
planned to market economies, and to the European Union. Real GDP growth in the region 
has been strong since 2000, reaching an average of over 5 percent p.a. over the period 
2000-2006 and forecasts for 2007 are optimistic. 
 
Inflation has generally been declining in most of the region, averaging about 4 percent 
in 2005. However, since 2002-03 inflationary pressures have been mounting in the Baltic 
countries and in Bulgaria, delaying the prospect for Euro adoption for the Baltic 
countries. This rise reflects both exogenous and internal factors, including rising food and 
energy prices and wage increases in the Baltic countries
12, and a sharp boost in domestic 
demand (fueled by increases in real income, high consumer confidence about future 
growth and a rapid credit expansion -in particular loans to households). The latter has led 
                                                 
11  Based on data from IMF’s IFS and WB’s WBI and EU8+2 QER. 
12 The labor markets in these countries are tightening, with a decline in unemployment and labor migration 
leading to skills shortages and market bottlenecks. 
  9to a surge in asset prices in the Baltic countries, especially real estate prices, creating 
fears of asset price bubbles. In addition, for countries with inflexible exchange rates
13, 
inflation above EU levels (the EU 25 average was 2.2 percent in 2005) has led to an 
appreciation of the real effective exchange rate (REER). 
 
Most of the region has experienced real exchange rate appreciation since 2001, with 
sharper increases in 2005. That is in part explained by the large inflows of foreign direct 
investments (FDI) to the region, attracted by relatively lower labor costs and skilled labor 
force, good infrastructure and prospects of becoming an outsourcing manufacturing or 
service hub for Western Europe. While some real appreciation may be driven by 
fundamentals (Balassa-Samuelson effects among others), some may reflect overvaluation 
and misalignment. The differential in inflation between the region and the rest of the EU 
(the main trading partner) is leading to further real exchange rate appreciation - 
particularly worrisome for the countries under fixed exchange rate regimes. Increasing 
wage pressures in the Baltic countries (faster than total-factor productivity -TFP) also 
contribute to competitiveness losses and slower output growth.
14
 
The inflationary pressures are manifesting themselves into rising interest rates 
which, with the exception of the Czech Republic, are above interest rates in the Euro 
Area (particularly for Hungary). This differential, if combined with a perception of lack 
of exchange rate risk, could encourage further inflows of capital (in a context of absence 
of capital controls), leading to further appreciation of the exchange rate. If some of these 
inflows were speculative, they could present a significant risk in the context of a possible 
depreciation and reversal of external flows. 
 
The domestic demand boom has led to a regional surge in imports and large current 
account deficits. Imports also grew due to the sharp increase in oil and gas prices, as 
Emerging European Countries are all largely dependent on energy imports. By contrast, 
the share of exports in GDP grew much less in general, under the effect of wage inflation 
above TFP improvement, and REER appreciation. Overall, while investments increased, 
savings increased much less
15, leading to large current account deficits, especially in the 
Baltic countries, Southern European countries, particularly Bulgaria and Romania, and in 
Hungary and Slovakia. Only the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia have current 
account deficits below 4 percent of GDP. Hungary and Croatia have significant twin 
deficits. 
 
The current account deficits have been financed by large FDI inflows, especially in 
Estonia and Bulgaria (about 20 percent of GDP in 2005 in each country), and in Romania 
and the Czech Republic (5 to 10 percent of GDP).  
 
                                                 
13 Countries with inflexible exchange rate regimes include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Hungary 
and Bulgaria, while the Czech Republic, Poland and Romania exhibit more flexibility. Slovenia adopted the 
Euro in January 2007. 
14 As competitiveness becomes more global, this development model will come under stress, unless 
countries are able to climb the “innovation ladder”, adding more value to manufacturing goods. 
15 Interestingly, this trend is the result of private sector savings and investment imbalances, rather than 
public sector imbalances (see WEO Sep. 06). 
  10In the Baltic countries, foreign borrowing by banks has also played a large role in 
financing the deficits (including in Estonia in recent years), so that the net debt liabilities 
of these countries have increased sharply. Thus, while the external debt to GDP ratio has 
remained at relatively low levels for Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and particularly the 
Czech Republic and Romania, it has been rising sharply in other countries, reaching 
levels above 75 percent of GDP in 2006. In the case of Latvia external debt to GDP 
reached about 112 percent in 2006. 
 
The debt is subject to currency, interest and maturity risk. A significant part of the 
debt is indeed denominated in foreign currency –mostly Euros (in part because some of it 
has been contracted via foreign banks). This currency mismatch – combined with a 
decrease in the export to import ratios of many countries and therefore of earnings in 
foreign currency – could hurt the economy of these countries in the event of devaluations. 
Maturity mismatches, leading to liquidity risk, are also high. Short-term debt over total 
external debt is above 40 percent in Lithuania, Latvia and Slovakia and the ratio of short 
term public debt over foreign exchange reserves was very high in the Baltic countries at 
the end of 2005 (at about 150 in Lithuania, 250 in Estonia and 350 in Latvia). There are 
also re-pricing risks, as some of these debts are contracted with floating rates and some 
will be refinanced. 
 
With regards to the fiscal situation, the region has in general not taken full 
advantage of the strong economic growth to consolidate fiscal positions. The Central 
Eastern European countries are all running budget deficits, albeit relatively small (except 
in Hungary where it reached 6.5 percent of GDP in 2005). In Croatia the deficit stood at 
about 4 percent of GDP in 2005. Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia are running small surpluses 
by most accounts and Lithuania and Romania small deficits. As several of these countries 
held elections in 2006 and others have elections in 2007, fiscal policies have been loose 
and the fiscal outlook for 2007 does not envisage any turn around except in Hungary (see 
EU8 QER, Sep. 06). In addition, in some of the Central Eastern European countries (for 
example Croatia) adequate fiscal adjustment would require unpopular decreases in public 
expenditures through public sector downsizing. Furthermore, implicit public sector 
liabilities have been building-up in several of these countries as a result of unfunded 
social security systems. 
 
Table 3: Selected macroeconomic indicators, Q3 2006 
 
   CZ EE HU LT LV PL SI SK BG RO HR
GDP growth, SNA (real, %, yoy)  5.8 11.3 3.8 6.3 11.8 5.8 5.6 9.8 6.7 8.3 4.7
Domestic Demand, (real, %, yoy) 5.5 16.1 -0.3 8.9 6.1 6.5 9.2 12.1 7.1
Current account balance, (4Q cumulative, % of GDP) -3.7 -12.4 -6.2 -10.4 -18.3 -1.9 -2.8 -10.4 -14.0 -10.4 -8.2
REER index (2000 = 100, HICP-based, increase = appreciation) 127.4 113.1 120.2 95.9 103.0 102.8 103.8 140.3 121.0 127.4 87.7
FDI (4Q cumulative, % of GDP) 3.7 1.5 6.0 2.1 5.9 2.8 0.8 6.6 14.8 7.2 5.2
Total gross external debt (eop, % of GDP) 36.8 92.9 91.7 56.3 112.0 47.3 76.5 54.2 77.5 27.4 82.4
Change of international reserves in euro (eop, relative to previous period, %) 1.6 12.7 -0.5 4.1 18.8 4.1 -5.1 -15.1 7.3 2.1 -7.0
Reserves-to-short-term debt ratio (eop, %) 189.8 46.5 159.4 81.8 137.0 149.9 222.4 207.5 157.9 #DIV/0! 224.4
Money Supply-to-Reserves ratio (eop, %) 285.7 331.4 272.5 277.7 138.2 297.0 190.2 142.8 179.2 86.1 294.0
Credit to private sector (eop, % of GDP) 38.2 79.8 55.6 47.2 80.8 31.7 63.2 37.7 44.5 24.7 68.0
Growth rate of credit to the private sector (avg, %) 19.4 34.0 24.8 55.2 61.1 20.5 26.6 21.9 23.6 55.0 22.4
Foreign currency loans to the private sector (eop, % of loans to priv. sect.) 10.3 78.1 51.9 55.6 74.4 27.3 57.4 19.6 45.1 46.9 9.2
Short-term (3M) interest rates spreads to euro area (avg, basis points) -84.0 8.0 407.0 4.0 156.0 98.0 25.0 171.0 18.0 529.0 #N/A
























Source: QER, January 2006, World Bank. 
 
  11Turning to political and global risks, a number of fragilities can be pointed out too. 
Firstly, recent elections have resulted in weak alliances in many countries and 
upcoming elections in others increase uncertainty. These elections have generally put 
the momentum for the reform agenda on hold. On the global front, an oil shock, 
slowdown in EU growth, increases in European or global interest rates, sudden stops in 
capital flows or FDI could have a significant negative impact on the region. Interestingly, 
the turbulence and volatility in May-June, 2006, revealed significant vulnerabilities in 
financial markets as a result of investors’ attitude towards the region and an eventual re-
pricing of risk by investors. It also highlighted the higher danger such an event could 
pose for countries with large fiscal deficits and foreign debts. 
 
Secondly, the risk of contagion should not be downplayed. Many of the Emerging 
European countries share indeed common creditors and investors, which could 
potentially lead to a non-discriminating pull-out of investments and attack on currencies, 
as it occurred in Asia in 1997. In addition, the strong presence of some Western European 
countries in the Emerging European Countries may also lead to the transmission of 
potential problems in Western Europe to the region. 
 
In conclusion, in spite of the remarkable economic performance of the Emerging 
European Countries overall, macroeconomic imbalances are still prevalent in the 
region in the form of large external deficits, appreciating real effective exchange rates 
and inflationary pressures, fragile public finances, large public sectors, uncertainty 
regarding commitment to reforms and exposure to global shocks. The Baltic countries 
(and to a lesser extent Bulgaria) stand out for their higher vulnerability on all of these 
criteria, so that many agree that signs of overheating are evident in these countries (see 
EU8 QER, Jan. 07). With a large part of FDI inflows going to the non-tradable sector and 
limited growth in the share of manufacturing and of exports in GDP, as well as relatively 
shallower financial systems, productive capacity in the Baltic countries seems indeed 
unable to keep pace with the growing aggregate demand. As a matter of fact, the IMF 
estimates that a positive output gap of 1 to 2 percent of GDP has emerged in these 
countries in 2006.
16 Experts are increasingly arguing that the situation in the Baltic 
countries is not sustainable as the slow increase in their productive capacity will not 
enable them to repay their large foreign denominated debt. A preliminary analysis of 
potential future scenarios is presented in Section 3. 
 
B.  Banking Sector and Potential Vulnerabilities 
 
In addition to the macroeconomic vulnerabilities described in the previous chapter, 
rapid credit growth may in theory also lead, with an unknown lag, to the 
appearance of weaknesses in the banking sector. We now review the health of banks 
in the Emerging European Countries. 
                                                 
16 See World Bank (2007). 
  12 
 (i) Financial robustness of banks 
 
An analysis of the current financial health of banks in the Emerging European 
Countries suggests prima facie that banks are stronger than in the past with 
satisfactory prudential ratios overall
17. Indeed, the overall efficiency and profitability 
of banks in the Emerging European Countries have improved in all countries and are in 
line with, or above, those of Euro Zone banks (see Figure 6 to Figure 8). Capital 
adequacy ratios are well above those of banks in the Euro Zone overall, but have been 
falling in all of the Emerging European Countries, except Poland, over the last decade.
18 
It should be emphasized that these are not risk-adjusted indicators. 
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Source of all three figures: BankScope 
 
                                                 
17 The analysis is based on Bureau van Dijk’s BankScope database of the financial statements of banks. 
Note that the database is often said to be biased towards larger banks. Nevertheless, Schmitz (2004), 
comparing BankScope data with IFS data, finds that approximately 70–90% of total banking assets is 
covered by BankScope for CEE countries. Mathieson and Roldos (2001) estimate data coverage to about 
90% of total banking assets in the CEE countries. 
18 These have been proxied by the ratios of total capital funds to net loans in the absence of consistent CAR 
data for all countries over the period. These ratios are likely to understate the CAR given the large share of 
mortgage loans (with a risk-weigh of 50 percent according to Basle I rules) in total loans in all countries. 
  13There has been a visible improvement in the quality of banks’ credit portfolios since 
the end of the 1990s, as shown by the reduction in the ratio of measured NPLs to total 
loans. The overall improvement is partly the mathematical result of the expansion of loan 
volumes (higher denominator) and some write-offs of irregular loans (lower numerator), 
as well as the result of concrete improvements such as the introduction of more stringent 
credit underwriting standards, improved risk management and capital allocation policies, 
as well as the adoption of IFRS-compliant accounting methods (all stimulated by the 
entry of foreign banks and the alignment of regulatory and supervisory practices with EU 
standards). However, a slight increase in NPLs can be observed in 2005, especially in 
Estonia, Poland and Hungary, and high credit growth can lead to increased NPLs with a 
lag. Nevertheless, a forthcoming IMF study on credit growth in the EU8 Countries 
(Fabrizio et al., 2006) concludes that there is no strong evidence that rapid credit growth 
has so far weakened bank soundness in any of the EU8 countries.
 19
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The countries with the fastest 
credit growth are also those 
with the highest median capital 
adequacy ratios (in particular, 
Romania, Latvia and Bulgaria). 
Lithuania is a notable exception 
with one of the weakest median 
capital adequacy ratio (albeit well 
above the Basle minimum 
threshold ratio of 8 percent) –see 
Figure 10. 
Figure 10: Credit growth and capital adequacy, 2005


























                                                 
19 A caveat is that the NPL data are as good as the loan classification systems, internal bank risk control and 
risk management practices, and enforcement capabilities of the supervisory agencies. 
  14Figure 11: Credit growth and loan loss reserves, 2005










0.00% 1.00% 2.00% 3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00% 7.00%














Similarly, the countries with 
the fastest credit growth are 
also those with the lowest level 
of non performing loans 
(proxied by the level of loan loss 
reserves in percentage of gross 
loans)
20 –see Figure 11 -- but 
NPLs are a lagging indicator of 
credit quality. In particular, the 
Baltic countries have the lowest 
levels of loan loss reserves
21, 
followed by Romania. 
Interestingly, Lithuanian banks, which had the smallest median capital adequacy ratio, 
had in fact the lowest median level of non loss reserves in 2005. Among countries with 
an average annual compounded credit growth over 20 percent, Bulgaria has the lowest 
observed asset quality. 
 








Latvia Estonia Lithuania Bulgaria Romania Czech Rep. Slovakia Poland Slovenia Hungary
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
 
Source: Bankscope 
The distribution of loan loss 
reserve ratios by quintiles 
reveals differences among 
countries. While all banks in the 
Baltic countries seem to have 
levels of loan loss reserves below 
5 percent of gross loans, some 
banks in Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Poland and Slovenia 
have significantly higher levels 
of bad loans
22 -see Figure 12. Of 
these countries, Bulgaria is the 
only one with an average annual 
compounded credit growth above 20 percent. 
 
Thus, among the countries that are experiencing the fastest credit growth (i.e. the 
Baltic countries, Bulgaria and Romania), our analysis suggest that Latvia, Estonia 
and Romania have among the highest median capital adequacy ratios and among 
the lowest median level of non performing loans (proxied by their ratios of loan loss 
reserves). Lithuania has the lowest median level of capital adequacy ratio among its 
peers, which gives it a low cushion to absorb potential credit shocks, but it also has the 
lowest level of bad loans today. As to Bulgarian banks, they tend to have a large capital 
                                                 
20 Loan loss reserves are a good proxy for NPLs as long as regulation and supervision ensures NPLs are 
recognized and provisioned timely and adequately, an acceptable proposition in countries applying EU 
standards. NPL ratio time series data are not consistently available for all countries under study. 
21 Note that practices to require reimbursement of real estate loans covered by collateral before they 
become non performing may lead to an artificially low level of NPLs in the Baltic countries. 
22 Note that the ratio of loan loss reserves in Poland is artificially inflated by legal difficulties preventing 
banks from passing into losses loans that should be written off, which forces them to maintain provisions 
on lost loans on their balance sheets. 
  15buffer to absorb potential credit shocks -but some of them seem to have relatively high 
levels of bad loans. 
 
Three factors do however mitigate this overall reassuring conclusion. Firstly, the 
low levels of NPLs experienced today by the Emerging European Countries do not 
mean that their credit 
portfolios are not at risk 
of future sharp 
increases in NPLs, as the 
past experience of several 
countries in this and other 
regions suggests (see 
Figure 13 in the case of 





should have decreased that risk significantly by ensuring that NPLs are recognized and 
provisioned timely (see later). In case of such sudden increase in NPLs, stress tests 
performed by local central banks tend to conclude that banks are overall resilient. 
However, some tests highlight potential stability issues in case of substantial increases in 
NPLs (see Box 2). 
Figure 13: Historical changes in credit growth and NPLs, 
selected dates and countries 
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Secondly, in contrast to the late 1990s, the pace of credit growth since 2001 is no 
longer dependent on bank soundness, with weaker banks expanding credit as rapidly as 
sounder banks (see Fabrizio et al., 2006). The negative correlation between bank 
soundness and credit growth seems to be the highest in household lending. It is also 
higher in the Baltic countries and in foreign currency lending. The study concludes that 
the prudential risks associated with the current credit growth have risen and stresses that 
potential credit quality problems at weaker banks are likely to materialize in financial 
soundness indicators with a variable lag, unless these banks strengthen their credit 
origination standards and risk practices. This will likely depend on how well these banks 
address the trade off between allocating human resources to credit screening and 
expansion vs. ex-post credit evaluation and monitoring. Overall, the study concludes 
however that there is no strong evidence yet that rapid credit growth has weakened bank 
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Box 2: Stress Tests Results by Central Banks (CB), selected Emerging European Countries 
Stress testing, in the context of financial sector surveillance, refers to a range of techniques to help assess 
the vulnerability of a financial system to exceptional but plausible events (see FSAP: a Handbook). 
Notably, stress test results evaluate effects of large movements in key variables with low probability of 
occurrence (“fat tail” events) and care should be taken in their interpretation. 
 
The Central Banks (CBs) of Emerging European countries have adopted various approaches to stress 
testing, involving credit, interest rate, exchange rate and contagion shocks individually or under broader 
scenarios, expressing the effect as a percentage of bank capital adequacy, assets or profitability. Not all 
CBs make these results available to the public for stability concerns, although typically some conclusions 
may be found in their Financial Stability Reports (FSR). Appendix 1 provides a rudimentary overview of 
the reported CB stress test results in selected Emerging European countries. 
 
Overall, the CB tests lead their respective authorities to conclude that the banking sector as a whole is 
resilient to macroeconomic and prudential shocks, with some banks showing greater sensitivity. However, 
some clear weaknesses are apparent from the tests. Some affect a few selected banks only. For instance, in 
Poland, the CB tests highlight that the CAR of one bank falls below 8% in all stress scenarios. The 
resilience of that bank is clearly weak. Other weaknesses appear larger in scope. For instance, the Slovakia 
CB stress tests highlight that credit risk could be a stability concern under the current fast lending growth in 
case of a strong deterioration in asset quality. Also, while the Latvian CB stress tests report no significant 
problems in absorbing a three-fold expansion of NPLs (with NPLs amounting to only 0.5 percent of total 
loans at the end of June 2006), a 5 percentage point increase in NPLs would result in banks representing 
nearly 50 percent of total assets with CAR below 8%. Given that a 5 percentage point increase in NPLs 
may not be of a remote probability according to past international experience, the tests may suggest 
stability concerns (see details in appendix 1). 
 
Note: Results as reported in CB websites. 
 
Thirdly, the rise in foreign exchange denominated loans and in maturity 
mismatches on banks’ balance sheets raises serious concerns. First, the growing share 
of foreign currency-denominated loans (see Figure 14) exposes banks to direct 
(mismatches in their balance sheets) and indirect credit risks (if borrowers’ earnings are 
denominated in domestic currencies). Since a high share of consumer and housing loans 
are in fact denominated in foreign currencies (Euros, Swiss Franks and Yen in some 
cases), it is highly likely that a substantial part of these loans is indeed subject to such 
currency risk, as individuals mostly have income in domestic currency in the Emerging 
European Countries.
23 Central banks generally conclude that the risk remains limited 
primarily because of the historical stability of domestic currencies. However, this is a 
growing unhedged exposure that could precipitate massive loan quality problems in the 
case of currency devaluations. Banks’ balance sheets in the Emerging European 
Countries are also exposed to liquidity risk as loans tend to be financed through mostly 
short term deposits but are increasingly funding long term real estate loans and 
mortgages. In addition, foreign-denominated loans are exposed to interest rate risks out of 
the control of local central banks. 
                                                 
23 Although labor migration has led to skills shortages, bottlenecks and increased wage pressures, countries 
are benefiting from increased worker remittances from official and unofficial entries. WB inflows estimates 
of workers' remittances, compensation of employees and migrant transfers through formal channels in the 
countries under study (excluding the Czech Republic) are estimated to amount to about US$13.5 billion, 
with Romania at US$ 4.5, Poland at 3.5, Bulgaria at 2 and Croatia at 1.2 billions respectively. 
  17 























Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovenia Slovakia














Sources: IMF, World Bank calculations, Fitch IBCA 
 
To conclude, the apparent health of banks in the Emerging European countries 
hides risks of potential future deterioration. Banks in the Emerging European 
Countries are at present displaying strong financial soundness indicators overall and there 
is little sign of deterioration. However, the increasing participation of weaker banks in the 
current credit expansion raises prudential concerns, as do the rising share of foreign-
denominated lending and the existence of liquidity risks. It should also be re-emphasized 
that low NPLs today could give a false sense of security, as NPLs are clearly a lagging 
indicator of portfolio quality. Finally, differences in financial soundness indicators among 
countries (in particular capital adequacy ratios and loan loss reserve ratios) suggest the 
existence of lower capital buffers in Lithuania and higher levels of credit risks in 
Bulgaria. 
 




















Foreign banks (% of total banking sector loans)
 
Sources: Own calculations based on Bankscope data 
 
Jointly with the strong financial 
soundness indicators generally 
presented by banks in the region, 
the large presence of foreign banks 
has also been seen as reassuring. In 
all the Emerging European Countries, 
except Slovenia and Romania, foreign-
owned banks dominate the national 
banking system (see Figure 15).
24 These foreign banks come mostly from other European 
countries
25 and their presence is usually seen as leading to improved banking practices, 
especially in terms of credit risk analysis and risk management.  
 
                                                 
24 By foreign banks we mean banks currently owned by a majority of shareholders incorporated in the old 
European countries, the US, Japan and Korea. Banks owned by regional shareholders are not considered 
foreign. Bank ownership is considered post past privatizations. 
25 In particular, from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, and Norway. 
  18Figure 16: Average annual compounded credit growth 
rate in the EU10 countries (1998-2005) 
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Source: Own calculations based on Bankscope data 
Figure 17: Share of credit growth attributable to 
foreign banks in the EU10 countries (1998-2005) 
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Source: Own calculations based on Bankscope data. 
Interestingly, foreign banks have 
been responsible for a large part 
of the credit growth observed in 
recent years in the Emerging 
European Countries. In most 
countries, with the notable 
exceptions of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, 
foreign bank credit has indeed 
been growing faster than domestic 
banks’ (see Figure 16). However, 
even in those countries where 
domestic banks have been growing 
faster than foreign banks, these 
represent a small part of the 
banking system, so that overall, in 
all countries, the large majority of 
the new credit issued since 1998 
(85 percent on average) has been 
originated by foreign banks (see 
Figure 17). This is perceived as a 
source of comfort for supervisors, 
as foreign banks are deemed in 
possession of better tools and 
processes to assess and monitor 
credit risks, as well as of deeper pockets (parent banks) to address possible shocks (as a 
result of which the fiscal cost of a potential bank crisis would likely be lower). 
 
However, the presence of foreign banks is not all reassuring. Firstly, despite the 
deep pockets of these banks’ mother companies, the extent to which they would 
come to the rescue of their eastern European subsidiaries remains unclear.
26 For 
most of these foreign banks, their eastern European subsidiaries represent indeed a small 
share of their assets and one may wonder if the mother company would want to invest 
more capital in them at a time of a potential regional crisis (see Box 2). This risk is 
mitigated by the reputational risk which Western European banks would face if they did 
not rescue one of their Eastern European subsidiaries. Pressure from the EU may also 
prevent this to happen.
27
 
Secondly, the large presence of foreign banks exposes these countries to higher 
contagion risks. Difficulties in the banking sector of one mother bank’s country could 
affect its Eastern European subsidiaries and, reciprocally, problems in one country in 
Eastern Europe could trigger a withdrawal by foreign banks from other countries in the 
region (as did Japanese banks during the Asian crisis)
28. In Latvia, the problem is 
                                                 
26 It should be noted that these are not foreign branches, but separate legally and capitalized subsidiaries. 
27 Nonetheless, it should be mentioned that international reputable banks did leave Argentina following the 
2001 crisis. 
28 See Martinez Peria et al. (2002) 
  19compounded by the large share of non-resident deposits, which, as the Uruguay crisis has 
shown, could also flee in case of difficulties. In addition, a decision by foreign banks to 
stop pouring liquidities into the region might have serious consequences for these 
countries. This is particularly true in the Baltic countries where most of the current 




Box 3: The Case of Raiffeissen 
 
The table below highlights asymmetries stemming from foreign ownership in the case of Raiffeissen 
Bank. While the Austrian Raiffeissen Zentralbank is present in all of the Central European countries 
with subsidiaries that account for a large share of the local banking systems (up to 19 percent of total 
banking sector assets in the case of Slovakia), these subsidiaries represent only a small share of 
Raiffeissen Zentral bank’s assets (5 percent in the case of Slovakia). 
 
Table: Raiffeissen subsidiaries in the EU10 countries, asymmetry of weighs (2006) 




Balance-sheet total  
(€ mn) 
total banking sector 
assets  Raiffeisen Int.  RZB Group 
Slovakia   4,862  19%  12%  5% 
Bulgaria   1,436  13%  4%  2% 
Croatia 3,896  11%  10%  4% 
Romania   3,028  11%  7%  3% 
Hungary   4,913  9%  12%  5% 
Czech Republic   2,619  3%  6%  3% 
Slovenia   910  3%  2%  1% 
Poland   2,860  2%  7%  3% 
Total 20,628  6%  51%  22% 
Source: Raiffeissen’s website, Bankscope. 
Note: This table is limited to Raiffeisen’s subsidiaries in the EU10 countries, but the situation is similar in other 
countries for instance in the Balkans. 
 
Thirdly, rapid credit growth by foreign banks with sophisticated credit assessment 
models may lead to the formation of a dual banking system, in which they “cherry-
pick” low risk deals and borrowers, while others (mostly domestic banks) are left with 
risky deals and borrowers (adverse selection).  
 
Fourthly, financial crises have occurred even in countries with high-quality banking 
systems (e.g. the savings and loans crisis in the 1970s in the USA, the 1990s banking 
crises in Nordic countries). 
 
(iii) Strong regulatory and supervisory frameworks 
 
As part of the convergence process, banking sector legal, regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks have improved significantly in all the Emerging European Countries. 
The Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAP) conducted by the World Bank and 
the IMF in these countries have generally concluded that compliance with the Basle core 
principles (BCPs) was high. In general, supervisory structures are strong, enjoying 
adequate independence and staffing, supervisors have adequate legal protection and 
supervision methods are increasingly risk-based. Regulatory forbearance is infrequent 
  20and enforcement is generally consistent. While a driving factor for many of these changes 
has been the need to harmonize with EU standards, it also reflects the authorities’ strong 
commitment in all these countries to creating a well-functioning and well-supervised 
financial system. 
 
In all countries, the financial sector infrastructure has also been significantly 
strengthened (credit bureaus, payment systems, corporate and collateral registries in 
particular), the use of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) generalized, 
and auditing is now subject to International Standards on Auditing (ISAs), enabling 
banks and market participants to make more informed credit decisions. In addition, 
creditors’ rights and insolvency frameworks have been strengthened (see the Doing 
Business indicators –www.doingbusiness.org). 
 
Nevertheless, some issues remain. Most shortcomings are considered minor and not 
hampering the supervisor’s capability to perform their supervisory responsibilities. They 
include further progress in integrating supervision (for those countries such as Slovakia 
that have integrated their supervisory agencies), as well as ensuring adequate supervision 
of banks that will be using their own internal credit models under Basle II. However, the 
lack of adequate cooperation between home and host supervisory bodies means that 
supervisors in home countries are not fully aware of the risks posed by their Emerging 
European Country exposure to their banks, while host country supervisors are not well 
aware of the health of foreign bank entities in their countries. Memorandums of 
understanding, when they exist, are rarely complemented by reciprocal visits and sharing 
of information. The issue will become even more important under Basle II, where the 
challenge for national supervisors will be to ensure they maintain an effective role 
regarding supervision of banks which are systemically important in their country despite 
their using their mother company’s internal credit risk models (which might not be well 
“calibrated” to the local circumstances). 
 
(iv) Financial robustness of borrowers 
 
Risks may also be analyzed at the level of borrowers. Since loan quality traditionally 
has the highest impact on banks’ balance sheets and depends directly from borrowers’ 
capacity to repay their loans, an analysis of the financial strength of borrowers in the 
Emerging European Countries becomes relevant. The financial strength of corporate 
borrowers is usually measured by some key financial indicators, including their leverage, 
debt structure and debt service coverage ratios.
29 Measures of households’ capacity to 
repay their consumer and housing loans can be proxied by measures of their overall 
indebtedness and savings. 
 
Despite the importance of these indicators in measuring potential credit risks, the 
little information that is available on these indicators in the Emerging European 
Countries is striking. From national statistics and other sources of publicly available 
information, it is impossible to get quality data on the financial health of borrowers in any 
of the Emerging European Countries. Faced with such limitation, we proxy the relevant 
                                                 
29 Banks would usually rely more on a cash flow analysis than on these indicators, but cash flow analyses 
cannot be performed in aggregate. 
  21indicators with indicators of the level of corporate and household debt respectively, 
recognizing that such proxy indicators face significant limitations. In particular, they do 
not allow to analyze how the available credit is spread across enterprises, nor the 
effective level of indebtedness of enterprises with borrowings or the debt maturity 
structure. 
 
Figure 18: Corporate sector and household debt in 
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Source: Frait (2006) 
The overall level of indebtedness of corporations and households in the Emerging 
European Countries remains low 
in absolute terms compared to 
the Euro Zone –see Figure 18, 
based on our proxy indicators. 
Corporate sector debt in the EU8 
countries averages 10-30 percent 
of GDP compared to more than 
150 percent in the Euro Zone. 
Household’s debt as a percentage 
of GDP was around 10 to 20 
percent compared to more than 40 
percent in the Euro Zone. In 
particular, residential housing debt 
was still significantly lower than in the Euro Zone (see Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19: Residential mortgage debt in percentage of GDP, 2005 
 
 
Source:  European Mortgage Federation 
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However, their debt presents a higher risk. The lower stock of existing assets 
(“wealth”) and the exposure to foreign currency risk which corporations and households 
bear in the Emerging European Countries increases the riskiness of their debt and 
decreases their capacity to repay under specific downside scenarios (such as in case of 
devaluation). Thus, it may indeed mean that they can only bear lower levels of debt than 
corporations and households in the Euro Zone. In addition, if only a portion of all 
enterprises have access to credit (which is likely in the Emerging European Countries 
where access to finance remains a problem, especially for SMEs)
30, the leverage and 
interest coverage ratio of those enterprises with borrowings may be very high. 
 
C.  Asset Market Imbalances 
 
As the literature on financial crises suggest that real sector imbalances can also lead 
to crises, especially through the appearance of price bubbles, we now briefly look at the 
stock and real estate markets in the Emerging European Countries. This analysis is of 
relevance as it can be a source of instability for the financial sector and the economy as a 
whole, but also because of the possibility that these sectors have experienced growth 
(even of a speculative kind) as a result of the high credit growth in the region. 
 
(i) Stock Market 
 
















































































































The development of stock 
exchanges is still at an early 
stage in the Emerging 
European Countries where 
total stock market 
capitalization amounted to 28 
percent of GDP in 2004, 
compared to 75 percent in the 
Euro Zone. The 
privatizations of the last 
decade have had a positive 
but limited impact on the 
development of the Emerging 
Europe’s stock exchanges.  
 
However, the situation is changing rapidly and stock markets in the Emerging 
European Countries have all experienced rapid equity price growth over the last two 
years, except for Slovenia (see Figure 20). While such rapid growth may be seen as a 
normal consequence of the transition process, it increases the potential vulnerability of 
these economies to financial contagion. The Asian crisis has for instance highlighted the 
growing interdependencies between world equity markets and investors’ “herd mentality” 
and the capital movements that may subject a country to global shocks. Studies of co-
movements between the region’s and international stock prices offer mixed conclusions 
                                                 
30 See for instance Flash Eurobarometer #184, 2006 (“SME access to finance in the new member states”). 
  23(mostly as a result of using different stock market indices, data frequency and sampling 
periods). Nevertheless, Gelos and Sahay (2000) document spillover patterns among 
transition economies and find increasing financial market integration since 1993, 
especially around the Russian crisis. 
 
The consequences of a future turmoil in the stock market are uncertain, as on the 
one hand their importance remains limited, but on the other hand their rapid growth 
demands caution. A fall in equity prices could result in fleeing foreign and national 
investors, putting pressure on the exchange rate, reserves and the monetary base, and 
resulting in higher interest rates and liquidity problems. The May/June 2006 or the March 
2007 emerging market turbulence did not result in such a scenario in the Emerging 
European countries, but their short lived nature may have left hidden potential future 
vulnerabilities. 
 
(ii) Real estate market 
 
Figure 21: Housing prices per square meter, annual % 
increase, 2002-2005, EU10 countries 
 
 
Source: Ahmad and Bakker (2006) 
House prices have experienced 
rapid growth and generated 
fear of a potential housing 
market bubble, especially in 
the Baltic countries (see Figure 
21). A common feature of credit 
growth in the region is the large 
contribution of housing loans. It 
is generally recognized that, 
while housing loans have 
contributed to sustained 
increases in the demand for real 
estate asset, the supply of real estate assets has not increased much in most of the 
Emerging European Countries.  
 
An adjustment in real estate prices could affect the banking sector in several ways. 
First, as the value of borrowers’ assets and wealth would fall, the adjustment could 
lead to potential increases in NPLs.
31 However, residential housing loans are usually 
recognized as among the safest bank assets (as a result of which their weight under Basle 
I is usually of 50 percent in the calculation of risk weighted assets, compared to 100 
percent for other loans). Episodes of historical real estate prices collapses, such as those 
observed during the Swedish crisis of the early 1990s and the UK real estate crisis of the 
late 1980s, have indeed not materialized in significant increases in NPLs. Nevertheless, 
with a large presence in some of the Emerging European Countries of foreign investors in 
real estate, sometimes financed through local banks (such as for instance in the Baltic 
countries where Russian investors have made large acquisitions), the safety of residential 
housing loans may not be as high as in the Swedish and British cases, where most 
residential housing was held by locals for their own use. 
 
                                                 
31 As, potentially, in the US in 2007 with sub-prime mortgages. See Global Financial Stability Report, 
April 2007. 
  24A downward adjustment in real estate prices would also affect the value of 
collaterals as real estate assets are increasingly used as loan collateral. This could 
lead to increased provisioning requirements for banks and ultimately higher losses if 
assets are foreclosed. Finally, with the use of real estate as collateral, spending has 
become more dependent on housing prices, so that an adjustment in real estate prices 
could slow down aggregate demand and economic growth. 
 
Section 4: Possible Scenarios: Catching-Up with Old Europe, Slow Painful 
Adjustment or Evolving towards a Potential Crisis? 
 
A.  Catching-up with Old Europe? 
 
There seem to be several legitimate reasons behind the rapid credit growth observed 
in the Emerging European Countries. Financial deepening is indeed a welcomed result 
in transition countries, resulting generally from higher economic activity and better 
economic prospects, as well as the parallel sophistication of the banking system. Large 
privatization processes, public sector retrenchment, the liberalization of the real estate 
market and other legal and regulatory improvements are often also key factors behind the 
rapid rise of bank loans to the private sector in transition economies. In addition, as 
mentioned in Box 1, macroeconomic 
conditions in the Emerging European 
Countries have been favorable for 
credit expansion. 
 
Thus, the rapid credit growth 
observed in the Emerging 
European Countries certainly 
reflects in part the deepening of 
their financial systems. Credit to 
GDP ratios are indeed expected to 
grow faster in transition economies 
than in industrial economies. Ratios 
of bank credit to GDP confirm indeed that the Emerging European Countries still have a 
lot to catch-up with compared to other European countries (see Figure 22). 
Figure 22: Private credit to GDP (2005) 
 




















Private credit to GDP, 2005  
Source: IFS
 
Today the level of credit reached in the Emerging European Countries appears to 
be in line with what their GDP per capita would dictate, as evidenced by the 
experience of other European countries (see Figure 23). 
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On that basis, some consider the current credit growth to be part of faster 
integration process into the EU. They see the current account deficits that result from 
the rapid credit growth as a positive factor indicating that capital inflows are attracted to 
the economies in question. They estimate that the current account deficits financed 
through FDI can be sustained along the examples of several countries including China 
and Australia recently, and Singapore in the 1960-80s. 
 
Thus, in this first scenario, market forces would lead to a progressive equilibrating 
process in the Emerging European Countries. In particular, lower corporate 
profitability due to wage inflation will put downward pressure on wages and possible 
restructuring that could help increase TFP. TFP will also increase as a result of the 
transfer of technology and the increase in productivity brought about by the FDI 
financing the current account deficit. Lower real wages and higher TFP will ease 
inflationary and REER pressures. This in turn will ease pressures on competitiveness, 
lower aggregate demand, and improve the current account (“virtuous cycle”). 
 
Under this scenario, labor market flexibility and increases in productivity are 
crucial, and government policies should be aimed at limiting increases in wages, 
ensuring greater labor market flexibility and maximizing technology transfers. 
 
However, detractors of that view insist that substantial differences exist between the 
situation in some of the Emerging European Countries (in particular the Baltic 
countries) and countries that have successfully run current account deficits for long 
periods of time, making the above scenario of a progressive painless adjustment utopist. 
In particular, in China and Singapore the growing current account deficits were 
accompanied by traditionally high and significant increases in savings, while growth in 
savings in the Emerging European Countries has been modest at best. In addition, some 
argue that there has been little transfer of technology to the Emerging European 
Countries as FDIs have been concentrated in the non-tradable sectors, so that TPF would 
not be able to increase sufficiently to lead future economic growth.
32 In China by contrast 
a significant part of FDIs went into productive investments. Furthermore, some argue that 
the depth of local financial markets is not rising fast enough in several of the EU10 
countries (e.g. in Poland), which further penalizes the financing of productive 
investments and the impact of credit growth to trickle down to the real sector and SMEs 
                                                 
32 Some disagree with this assertion as a significant share of FDIs has gone to the telecom sectors, where 
significant technology transfer and productivity improvement have taken place. 
  26in particular. Thus, according to this view, a painful adjustment process cannot be 
avoided (“hard landing”). 
 
B.  Evolving towards a slow painful adjustment process? 
 
The experience of Portugal is increasingly being used to suggest that the Emerging 
European Countries, especially the Baltic countries, will not be spared from a future 
slow painful adjustment, characterized by slow GDP growth over several years (see for 
instance Ahmed and Bakker, 2006). There are indeed a number of similarities between 
the recent experience of Portugal and the current situation in the Emerging European 
Countries, especially the Baltic countries. As in these countries indeed, Portugal 
experienced high demand-led growth rates from 1995 to 2000 driven by rapid credit 
expansion to households (household debt surged from 13 percent of GDP in 1990 to 61 
percent in 2000, fuelled by the strong decline in interest rates based on the prospect of 
accession to the EU, financial liberalization, and increased innovation and competition in 
the financial sector). Demand growth was also spurred by strong real wage increases 
(resulting from a tightening labor market and wage increases led by the public sector), a 
steady rise in permanent income expectations, a decline in the household saving rate and 
an increase in investment activity (particularly residential construction). However, the 
high domestic demand in Portugal was not matched by increases in domestic supply, with 
the economy near full employment and economic activity shifting to non-tradable sectors.  
 
As in Emerging Europe, especially the Baltic countries, the demand for tradable 
goods was satisfied through imports, leading to a high current account deficit and 
external indebtedness. As in Emerging Europe again, this led to a real exchange rate 
appreciation and a loss in competitiveness, accelerated by the impact of fast rising wages 
concealed initially by the high economic activity and productivity growth. It led 
eventually, alongside other factors, to the Portuguese recession of the early 2000s. ECB’s 
higher interest rate policy from 1999 to 2001 was perhaps the turning point exposing the 
country’s macroeconomic imbalances. The slowdown in international trade, weaker Euro 
area growth and the continuing weakness of the Brazilian economy where Portuguese 
firms were exposed, led to a reassessment of household expectations, lower domestic 
demand and weakening investment activity. As fiscal policy until 2001 was primarily 




A similar scenario cannot be excluded in the Emerging European countries. The rise 
in aggregate demand that sustains economic growth could slow down under various 
external shocks, including a slow down in older European countries leading to 
adjustments in expectations, an interest rate shock (for instance through an adjustment in 
interest rates in the rest of Europe, which could easily impact Emerging European 
Countries through foreign bank subsidiaries), or a more severe oil shock. With FDI 
focused on the non-tradable sectors and limited growth of exports, the economies of 
Emerging Europe could, as Portugal, find themselves incapable of sustaining their current 
levels of economic growth. And, as in Portugal again, governments in Emerging Europe 
                                                 
33 See IMF (2006). 
  27would have few instruments of policy response to stimulate aggregate demand or 
economic growth, so that these countries could fall into a prolonged recession as Portugal 
did since the early 2000. 
 
However, Portugal’s experience also suggest that the adjustment process in 
Emerging Europe, and in particular in the Baltic countries, could be limited to a 
prolonged period of economic slowdown, without a banking crisis. In Portugal, the 
banking sector has indeed held up well in recent years despite the difficult environment. 
Banks remain profitable, well capitalized and with declining NPLs. Given that in 
Emerging Europe, as in Portugal, the initial health of banks is strong (with some potential 
exceptions in Bulgaria where higher credit risks might be present), and the sector’s 
regulatory and supervisory frameworks are adequate, a similar scenario could indeed be 
replicated in Emerging Europe, although it cannot be taken for granted. 
 
Lessons from the Portuguese experience suggest that the increase in aggregate 
demand should be actively managed and growth of the domestic supply stimulated, 
in particular towards productive sectors. To that end, policies to encourage corporate -
as opposed to household- lending (such as policies to increase the quantity and quality of 
corporate sector information, improve creditors’ rights and insolvency laws, etc) would 
help stimulate exports and aggregate supply. Also, internationally competitive wage 
levels and labor market flexibility play an important role in limiting excessive aggregate 
demand growth and attracting FDI in tradable sectors. 
 
C.  Evolving towards an Asian-style crisis? 
 
The most pessimistic observers point out that the experience of other emerging 
markets suggests that crises have materialized under similar circumstances as those 
observed in the Emerging European Countries today, especially the Baltic countries, 
sometimes surprising the international community. The East Asian crisis is the most 
striking (but not the only) example in this regard. 
 
The East Asian financial crisis came after years of large foreign financial capital 
inflows intermediated by the domestic banking systems (as in Emerging Europe 
today). Other similarities with the Emerging European Countries, and particularly the 
Baltic countries and the Southern Eastern European countries (Regions 1 and 3 
respectively in the table below), include high current account deficits, inflationary 
pressure, and high external and short term debt (see Table 4). As in Emerging Europe, 
East Asian countries also had fragile fixed exchange rate regimes, real estate and stock 
market bubbles, and a large presence of foreign investors. Nevertheless, despite these 
weaknesses, the East Asian region was praised before the crisis for its fast GDP growth 
and its budget surpluses. However, little attention was paid to the rising imbalances in 
their private sectors. 
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Table 4: Macroeconomic indicator comparison: Emerging European Countries (2005) and Asia 
(1996) 
 Europe  2005  Asia  1996 
   Reg. 1  Reg. 2  Reg. 3  Total  Reg. 1  Reg. 2  Total 
GDP  growth  (annual  %)  9.1 4.6 4.8 6.0 6.8 7.9  7.3 
Inflation,  consumer  prices  (annual  %)  4.5 2.5 5.6 4.0 6.2 5.5  5.9 
Current account balance (% GDP) 
/1 -10.1  -4.1 -7.1 -7.1 -5.2 -4.6  -5.0 
External debt (% GNI) 
/2 77.0 51.9 53.9 60.7 60.9 46.1  53.5 
Short-term debt (% of total external debt) 
/2 43.4 30.4 18.4 32.0 39.2 23.0  32.7 
Reserves / Total debt (%) 
/2 23.9 48.1 56.6 41.9 24.6 48.5  36.6 
Central government balance (% GDP)  0.4  -3.2  -0.9  -1.6  0.7  0.5  0.6 
Domestic credit by banking sector (% GDP)  62.3  51.1  31.3  50.5  77.4  116.6  93.1 
Domestic credit to private sector  (%  GDP) 51.7 41.4 27.9 41.8 89.2 98.2  92.8 
FDI, net inflows (% GDP) 
/2 6.0 3.8 7.7 5.2 1.5 3.4  2.3 
S&P's Credit Rating  A to BBB-  A to BB 
Source: EU8 QER, GDF, IFS, WEO, Standard and Poor's Credit Ratings. 
Europe Region 1: Baltic countries; Region 2: central Eastern European countries; Region 3: Southern Eastern European 
countries. Asia Region 1: Indonesia, Korea Thailand; Region 2: Malaysia, Philippines.  
/1 Europe Region 3 figures for 2004, /2 Europe figures for 2004 
 
In Asia, the external inflows that helped finance the current account deficits came to 
a sudden reversal in 1997.
34 In addition, withdrawal by Japanese banks from the entire 
region aggravated the liquidity crunch. The exact reasons of the crisis are still debated 
today
35, but it is widely agreed that the interplay of weaknesses in fundamentals and 
panic on the side of investors resulted in strong unanticipated financial contagion.  
 
A similar scenario cannot be excluded in the case of the Emerging European 
Countries, where foreign banks provide large amounts of credit but for whom 
subsidiaries in these countries do not always individually contribute significantly to the 
mother company’s income. When the Asian crisis occurred, Japanese banks suffered 
capital losses, resulting in a sharp decline of financial flows from Japan to Asia, as well 
as slower direct investment by Japanese firms as the availability of capital in Japan was 
reduced.  
 
But, despite these similarities, a number of differences can be pointed out as well. 
The quality of banking supervision is considered higher in the Emerging European 
Countries, connected lending does not appear to be an issue and credit growth partly 
reflects a catching-up from low initial levels. Moreover, membership in the EU is a major 
difference. At the time of the Asian crisis, domestic credit in Asia reached indeed almost 
twice the level observed in the Emerging European Countries today in percentage of 
GDP. Thus, while in Asia the liquidity crunch brought about by the crisis revealed 
inherent weaknesses in the banking sector and further aggravated the crisis and dented 
investors’ confidence; banks in Emerging Europe may be better placed at surviving a 
similar liquidity crunch given their better fundamentals. Thus, under such a scenario, 
investors’ confidence in Emerging Europe may be restored before a general banking 
                                                 
34 The net private capital inflows into Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea and the Philippines rose from 
US$38 to 97 billions between 1994 and 1996. In the second half of 1997, these reversed to outflows of 
US$12 billion. 
35 See Section 1. 
  29crisis spreads out. Countries, such as Bulgaria where credit risks may be higher, may be 
more prone to seeing a potential economic slowdown spread to the banking sector. 
 
Another key difference is that some of the Emerging European Countries (namely 
the Baltic countries, Slovakia and Slovenia) are under the ERM-II mechanism, 
under which after a debtor’s central bank makes use of its foreign reserves, it can draw on 
the very short-term financing facility, which is in principle automatically available in 
unlimited amount.
36 The ECB’s reserves are about 4 times the combined GDP of the 
Baltic States, constituting a strong base to defend against any currency speculative attack. 
But, as the agreement points out, the ECB and the participating non-Euro area central 
banks could suspend further automatic financing if it were to conflict with their primary 
objective of maintaining price stability. 
 
Next to the East Asian crisis, other banking crises have also come largely to the 
surprise of the international community. The Mexican crisis for instance materialized 
during a period of low inflation, fiscal responsibility, rapid privatization of banks and 
major structural reforms, with the primary weaknesses being the current account deficit 
(resulting in part from a domestic credit boom financed by foreign borrowing) as well as 
a an inadequate prudential framework, poor bank governance and the large presence of 
connected lending. Moreover, it took place in light of the country’s entry to NAFTA. 
However, a key difference with the Emerging European Countries lies in their stronger 
foreign owned banking system and better regulation and supervision.  
 
Other comparison have been made with the Nordic banking crisis of the early 1990s 
as well as with the ERM crisis of the early 1990s, which all confirm that significant 
macroeconomic vulnerabilities can lead to crises.
37 Finally, the Uruguay crisis of 2001 
highlighted that withdrawals by non-resident depositors can also precipitate or accelerate 
crises, as happened after the withdrawal of their deposits by Argentine depositors. Such 
experience is particularly relevant for Latvia where non-resident deposits represent a 
large part of total deposits. 
 
To conclude, the comparison with Asia primarily raises the questions of contagion 
and of the potential impact of international investors’ attitude. While there are 
similarities and differences with Asia’s crises in 1997 and with other countries that 
underwent financial crises, the literature on financial crises suggests that one must pay 
particular attention to the possibility of panics and of cuts in international financial flows. 
Financial innovations integrated Asia closely to international financial markets. This is 
also the case for the Emerging European Countries, increasing vulnerability to changes in 
                                                 
36 The ERM was based on the concept of fixed currency exchange rate margins. In 1993, the margin was 
expanded from 2.25% to 15%, following recurrent speculative attacks, mainly on the French Franc. the 
ERM2 was introduced in August 1993, following  the recurrent speculative attacks mainly on the French 
Franc, while the UK exited from the EMS (ERM1) already in September 1992.The EU10 national 
currencies themselves will become part of the ERM II at different dates, with Estonia, Lithuania and 
Slovenia having been included on 2004 and Latvia and Slovakia in 2005. 
37 The Swedish banking crisis of the early 1990s is particularly interesting (see Englund, 1999). In Sweden, 
newly deregulated credit markets stimulated competition among financial institutions, which, alongside an 
expansive macroeconomic policy, contributed to an asset price boom. The crisis materialized through a 
strong real interest shock resulting from a combination of a fixed exchange rate, excessive lending, a highly 
leveraged private sector, as well as exogenous events, such as the ERM crisis. 
  30market sentiment and financial market contagion. The expectations of Euro accession 
have created a strong sentiment of security among investors so far, but past success 
stories turning into crises abound. 
 
In the case of Asia (or indeed Mexico) foreign banks suspended lending rapidly 
when signs of trouble appeared, and in the case of Uruguay, foreign depositors 
withdrew their deposits worsening liquidity. If this were to happen in Emerging 
Europe, the consequences would be painful, especially in the Baltic countries. But, in 
Emerging Europe, on the one hand, past evidence suggests that foreign banks have not 
massively left the region during the periods of banking crises some countries experienced 
in the 1990s (see Haas and Lelyveld, 2005) and the domestic banking sectors in the 
Emerging European Countries are significantly stronger than in most countries with past 
banking crisis. On the other hand, today’s environment could be more fragile and 
interconnected than in the past and the urge to withdraw in case of distress from the 
region would have grave consequences for the countries, but not necessarily for the 
parent banks. 
 
Section 5: Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
 
The Emerging European Countries have experienced very rapid credit expansion 
over several years and are subject to significant macroeconomic imbalances, largely 
fueled by this rapid credit growth, despite their overall formidable economic 
performance since the beginning of their transition to market economies. To the question 
of whether the current credit growth is excessive or not, arguments have been made, in 
this paper and in literature, in both directions.  
 
Our analysis suggests that, in the short term, the risk that a macroeconomic shock 
(possibly triggered by an external shock) leads to an adjustment process in the 
Emerging European countries is higher than the risk of deterioration originated 
from the banking system. An economic growth slowdown scenario seems more likely 
than an overt economic-banking sector crisis scenario. 
 
The existence of these serious risks calls for a preventive policy response. Any 
adjustment in the future will indeed crucially depend on how the current situation is 
managed today. Appendix 2 examines Policy Responses in Eastern and Western Europe 
to past or current credit growth pressures. 
 
The main prudential/preventive means countries have at their disposal to achieve 
this include tighter  macroeconomic policies, tougher prudential and supervisory 
policies, and enforcement of administrative policies. Since vulnerabilities arise mostly 
from macroeconomic risks, some argue that policy responses should focus primarily on 
macroeconomic policy tools.  
 
In the Emerging European Countries, monetary tools may be of limited potential 
efficiency. On the monetary policy front, even putting aside the constraints under a fixed 
  31exchange rate regime
38, the openness of financial markets suggests that traditional 
monetary policies might be limited or even unproductive. Monetary tightening may divert 
borrowing abroad, increasing foreign currency borrowing and risk taking.  
 
Fiscal tightening should be considered, especially with regards to the real estate 
sector.  Fiscal policy can play an important role in restraining aggregate demand. 
However, its limitations should be recognized, such as the possible lack of political will, 
or time lags in implementation. Given the significant real sector credit expansion in most 
countries, to the extent that the sector is undertaxed, tax-based measures could possibly 
be used to moderate mortgage lending. Tax incentives for mortgage borrowing could be 
eliminated and a comprehensive real estate tax applied. Another possible policy response 
would be to apply temporary foreign exchange restrictions to moderate foreign banks’ 
credit expansion or limits on banks open foreign exchange market positions. This 
however will have to be considered in light of EU restrictions and take into account 
stability consequences for foreign banks. 
 
Short term capital controls have also been used sometimes successfully, such as in the 
case of Malaysia at the time of the Asian crisis or Chile. They may be a relevant option 
for countries which need to distinguish between resident and non-resident flows of funds. 
 
With regard to prudential and supervisory tightening, while their impact on 
controlling credit growth is unclear, their primary objective is to strengthen the 
health of the banking system. In general, particular attention should be paid in all 
countries, to risk-based supervision, cross border supervision and home-host cooperation, 
timely and thorough information disclosure by banks and companies, and the 
strengthening of their risk management capacity. These are indeed the measures and 
areas generally recognized as having the best impact on the quality of banks’ balance 
sheets, and where FSAPs have indicated some Emerging European Countries still present 
some weaknesses. 
 
Stronger and more targeted regulatory measures might be considered in countries 
with higher potential risk, such as the Baltic and Southern Eastern European 
countries. The instruments traditionally put forward first include increases in capital 
adequacy ratios and the introduction of dynamic provisioning
39 to dampen the cyclical 
fluctuations of lending activity. However, the former are not effective when Capital 
Adequacy Ratios (CARs) are above legal limits (as in all the Emerging European 
Countries) and dynamic provisioning tends to decrease transparency on actual asset 
quality (and may be seen as incompatible with IFRS principles which apply an incurred –
as opposed to expected- loss principles to provisioning). 
 
                                                 
38 Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the traditional monetary policy tools loose relevance. This is further 
so under open capital accounts. 
39 Spain has had dynamic provisioning since 2000. Dynamic provisioning addresses credit risk during 
credit boom periods by smoothing loan-loss provisioning over the economic cycle. As credit growth and 
loan portfolio quality exhibit strong cyclical fluctuations, dynamic provisioning uses historical experience 
to recognize that credit losses can be properly accounted and provisioned for in a statistical sense as soon as 
the risk (or the incurred loss) appears in the balance sheet. 
  32Increases in reserve requirement rates have also been used, but their long term 
impact has generally proven limited at best. If they become too high, they are likely to 
result in shifts to direct lending from abroad or from non bank financial institutions 
(NBFIs). Widening the reserve requirement base to include all liabilities, relevant off-
balance sheet items and NBFIs, while maintaining a single rate (to avoid 
misclassification), has led to better results than increases in the reserve requirement rates. 
Imposing minimum liquidity ratios is also likely to have limited impact, as foreign banks 
will probably satisfy them without an effect on credit expansion. 
 
Alternative instruments should be considered in these countries and targeted at the 
specific risks arising from indirect foreign exchange exposures and real estate risks.  
These instruments include tighter loan classification and provisioning rules, stricter 
assessment of real estate collateral, lower loan to value ratios, higher risk weights for 
certain type of loans (such as those in foreign currency to local currency earners), and the 
establishment of tighter minimum standards for borrowers.  
 
Such measures should not be incompatible with the EU Capital Requirements 
Directive nor with Basle II principles and IFRS principles. It is true that in general, 
stricter domestic prudential regulations than elsewhere in the EU may easily be evaded 
by booking loans offshore. Moreover, with the introduction of Basel 2, all EU members 
will be expected to implement uniformly the EU’s Capital Requirements Directive, 
leaving little room for stricter national implementation of the Directive, including in the 
areas of risk weighting of mortgages and loan-to-value rules. However, some articles of 
the Directive do leave t room for maneuver to regulators and supervisors, which should 
be used at times of difficulties.
40 IFRS principles also open the door for exceptional 
provisioning measures in certain circumstances.
41
                                                 
40 In particular, recital 15 of the CRD allows EU member states to “establish stricter rules than those laid 
down in the Directive, including with respect to Article 75” on the minimum level of own funds. In 
addition, recital 15 allows “member states to require that Article 123 of the Directive be complied with on 
an individual or other basis” (Article 123 requiring that credit institutions have in place sound, effective and 
complete strategies and processes to assess and maintain on an ongoing basis the amounts, types, and 
distribution of internal capital that they considered adequate to cover the nature and level of the risks to 
which they are or might be exposed.”) 
 
Furthermore, Article 136 of the CRD establishes that “competent authorities shall require any credit 
institution that does not meet the requirements of this Directive to take the necessary actions or steps at an 
early stage to address the situation. For those purposes, the measures available to the competent authorities 
include […] (a) obliging credit institutions to hold own funds in excess of the minimum level down in 
Article 75, [..], (c) requiring credit institutions to apply specific provisioning policy or treatment of assets in 
terms of own funds requirements, […]”. 
 
41 Banks subject to IFRS must follow IAS 39 for provisioning purposes. Article 58 of IAS 39 requires the 
review of financial assets for impairment. Article 59 establishes that loans can be recorded as impaired only 
when there is “objective” evidence that losses have been “incurred as a result of one (or more) loss events” 
and that “that loss event (or events) has an impact on the estimated future cash flows of the financial assets 
or group of financial assets that can be reliably estimated”. This definition may be seen to create a potential 
problem because a prospective downturn scenario would appear to pertain to expected rather than incurred 
losses. 
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On the supervision front, close inspection, close collaboration with home 
supervisors, and periodic stress testing of individual banks are crucial. Inspections 
targeted at analyzing the risks created by indirect foreign exchange exposures and real 
estate risks would help supervisors understand the extent of these risks better. However, 
it should be noted that such tightening has also potential downsides. It could potentially 
introduce competitiveness imbalances among financial sector players (e.g. foreign vs. 
domestic banks), or even reroute financing to less supervised channels (e.g. leasing 
companies or even foreign bank switching from subsidiaries to branches). Such efforts by 
supervisory authorities should thus be complemented by strong communication on the 
risks associated with rapid credit growth. More general inspections should be planned as 
soon as signs of deterioration in bank balance sheets would be seen. Closer cooperation 
with foreign supervisors is also needed to ensure adequate monitoring of foreign 
subsidiaries. Finally, efforts to adequately assess key risks in stress tests of the banking 
systems, especially indirect foreign exchange and real estate risks under specific 
macroeconomic scenarios, would help better understand macro-financial linkages and the 
degree of these risks. Requiring banks to conduct specific scenario-based tests would also 
raise their awareness of specific risks. 
 
Administrative measures, such as credit ceilings are temporary and last resort 
measures, usually with distortionary effects and they should thus generally be reserved 
to cases of excessive credit growth materializing in higher NPLs. Among the most likely 
distortionary effects of individual bank credit growth control are financing rerouting to 
other asset categories or other financial intermediaries, a reduction in banking sector data 
transparency and an increase in direct borrowing from abroad (as in Croatia in 2003). 
Finally, if the limits are not risk-based, they effectively punish the stronger institutions 
for risks taken by weaker banks. 
 
Measures to enhance the availability and quality of corporate sector information 
would also help facilitate a better monitoring of borrowers’ health by banks and the 
authorities. Coupled with other measures to stimulate corporate sector lending in 
countries where it has remained limited (especially the Central Eastern European 
countries) through improvements in the business environment for instance, such 
measures could also have a positive impact on aggregate supply, exports and economic 
growth. This however should take place alongside policies to strengthen banks’ ability to 
assess and monitor the creditworthiness of customers outside the traditional banking 
relationships, such as SMEs, where little prior experience exists. Furthermore, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
However, Article 59 further establishes a list of loss events that constitute an objective evidence of a loss. 
Among these events
41, recital (f) includes “observable data indicating that there is a measurable decrease in 
the estimated future cash flows from a group of financial assets since the initial recognition of those assets, 
although the decrease cannot yet be identified with the individual financial assets in the group, including 
[…] national or local economic conditions that correlate with defaults on the assets in the group (e.g. […], a 
decrease in property prices for mortgages in the relevant area, […].” 
 
This recital has been used in California to justify higher provisions when electricity shortages and higher 
electricity prices were seen as an event that could trigger loan impairment. Thus, signs of macroeconomic 
deterioration, such as pressure on the exchange rates, could justify in Emerging Europe higher provisions. 
 
  34development of capital markets would be an additional element to diversify risk and 
sources of financing for the corporate sector. 
 
Finally, authorities should prepare themselves for the unlikely, but possible scenario 
of an overt financial turmoil scenario. This means that adequate contingency plans 
need to be in place, defining in details responsibilities and restructuring methods should 
banks be intervened. Ideally, if the capacity of the authorities to implement such 
contingency plans has not been proven yet by real life cases, drills should be performed.  
 
In the case of a banking crisis, the authorities are likely to face significant problems 
in home-host co-operation given the large presence of foreign banks in the region 
and the natural reluctance to absorb losses incurred in another jurisdiction. Many 
host countries have already tried to address such potential problems by signing 
Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with home countries, but these are only first 
steps in co-operation and information sharing; they are usually not legally binding and do 
not address the underlying conflicts of interest. Furthermore, the quality of insolvency 
systems, creditor rights and debt restructuring mechanisms will also come to the forefront 
under a crisis. Doing Business indicators suggest that much is left to be desired on this 
field, and countries could enhance enormously these areas of prompt resolution and 
recovery in anticipation of bad times. 
 
In conclusion, a balanced approach between ensuring the benefits of convergence 
are reaped on the one hand, and ensuring its sustainability and limiting its risks on 
the other hand, is required in the Emerging European Countries where the risk that 
the current rapid credit growth and macroeconomic imbalances lead to a painful 
adjustment is not to be excluded. Given the lessons learnt in Asia and other past crises, 
it is clear that prudence should dominate the ‘growth vs. imbalance’ policy-related 
dilemma that the Emerging European Countries face today. To that end, sound 
macroeconomic policies are key, while initial closer inspection, forward-looking analysis 
and stress testing could suffice in most countries to monitor risks in the banking sector, 
but a rise in NPLs should be a trigger to implement stronger measures along the lines 
discussed above. In all countries, longer term policies to enhance the business 
environment and thus divert high credit growth to the productive sector instead of 
household consumption would also be advisable, as well as better home host cooperation 
and contingency planning. 
 
  35Appendix 1: Selected stress testing practices and results reported in FSRs in 
2005/2006 
Shocks Examined  Results Reported 
Czech Republic (FSR, 2005) 
Stress tests measure the impact on CAR of various shocks: 
A. Basic stress tests based on 2 scenarios: (i) Scenario I: 
increase in interest rates of 1 percentage point, depreciation 
of the exchange rate of 15% and increase in the share of 
NPLs of 30% by reclassification of loans, (ii) Scenario II: 
increase in interest rates of 2 percentage points, 
depreciation of 20% and increase in the share of NPLs in 
total loans of 3 percentage points. 
B. Maximum interest rate shock which the banking sector 
as a whole can absorb. 
C. Impacts of contagion in the interbank market in the event 
of a bank's capital inadequacy. 
D. Other tests based on results from the macroeconomic 
forecasting model and the credit risk model. 
-The resulting post-test CAR of the banking 
sector is above 8%, except in one test, 
which, however, was based on relatively 
extreme assumptions. 
-Some banks show greater sensitivity to 
interest rates and interbank contagion risks. 
-The banking sector is capable of 
withstanding the stress of shocks, including 
movements in exchange rates. 
Hungary (FSR 2006)  
The 2003 FSR present various stress tests measuring the 
impact on CAR of interest, exchange rate and credit risk 
shocks. Subsequent FSRs only report one “stress CAR” in a 
scenario where all NPLs are written off. 
The banking sector’s “stress CAR” declined 
during 2005, but that of the ten largest 
banks improved. 
Latvia (FSR, 2006) 
The FSR reports on the impact on CAR of gradual NPL 
increases, in the domestic, external and real estate sectors. 
Banks would have no significant problems 
in absorbing a potential credit risk increase 
resulting in a three-fold expansion of NPLs. 
Specific or sectoral credit risk shocks 
continue to point to banks' growing 
exposure to real estate market associated 
risks, but none of the analyzed shocks 
would cause bank insolvency. 
Lithuania (FSR, 2005) 
Banks submit the results of individual stress tests with 
scenarios and methods at their discretion (but including at 
least credit, market, liquidity and operational risks) to the 
CB. 
The CB also performs its own tress tests, measuring the 
impact on CAR of an increase in specific provisions by 2, 4 
and 6 times. 
If specific provisions increase by 2 or 4 
times, the overall CAR of the banking 
system would remain higher than 8 percent.  
 
With a 6 time increase, the average ratio 
would be below 8%. 
Poland (FSR, 2006) 
The stress tests measure the impact of a credit risk shock on 
CAR under the following 3 scenarios: 
A. Migration of satisfactory and special mention loans to 
doubtful loans. 
B. (i) All claims on non-financial customers from the 
substandard and doubtful categories are downgraded to the 
category of loss loans, (ii) a decrease in the value of loan 
security by 25% and 50%. 
C. Simultaneous bankruptcy of (i) the sector's three largest 
non-financial borrowers or (ii) the three largest financial 
sector borrowers. 
- Banks’ loan loss absorption capacity 
decreased in the first half of 2006: the CAR 
of domestic banks whose assets constitute 
1/5 of total assets would fall to 8% under 
scenario A, compared to 15% in Dec. 2005; 
- The CAR for one of the banks slid slightly 
below 8% in all scenarios. 
-Under C (i) only one bank’s CAR would 
drop below 8% (ii) the majority of banks’ 
CARs would stay above 11.5%. 
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Romania (FSR, 2006) 
The stress test measures the impact on CAR of a 18.6 
percent depreciation of the domestic currency exchange rate 
and a 6.7 percentage point decline in interest rate on leu 
denominated operations, considering indirect credit risk 
effects (exposure to companies). 
 
The average CAR remains high after the 
shock, at 16.7. On an individual basis, it 
remains higher than the minimum level of 
12 percent, except for one small bank. 
Slovenia (FSR, 2006) 
The stress tests measure the impact on pre-tax profit, return 
on equity (ROE), CAR, growth in loans and deposits of 
different shocks: 
A. Real GDP growth down 2.5 percentage points; 
B. Tolar interest rates up 4 percentage points, foreign 
currency interest rates up 2 percentage points; 
C. Interest margin down 1 percentage point; 
D. Exchange rate down 5%; 
E. Exchange rate up 5%. 
An assessment of credit risk via changes in the quality 
structure of banks’ portfolios is also performed. 
Banks are primarily exposed to interest-rate 
risk, while exchange-rate risk and the risk 
of lower economic growth are relatively 
less important. Attention should be drawn to 
the shortening of the open foreign exchange 
position in the corporate sector, which for 
banks represents a potential increase in 
credit risk in the event of a depreciation of 
the tolar. 
Slovakia (FSR, 2005) 
Stress tests measure the impact on CAR of various shocks: 
A. Foreign exchange risk: several scenarios based on 
historically “worst” exchange rate changes; 
B. Interest rate risk: 3 scenarios representing a parallel 
move, a change in the short term or long-term rates, and a 
change in the slope of the interest-rate curve. 
C. Credit Risk: 2 scenarios based on deterioration in the 
quality of the credit portfolio, and a fast growth in lending 
while the structure of loans and the overall risk in their 
portfolio remains unchanged. 
D. Liquidity risk: 3 basic scenarios of a large decline in the 
value of government bonds, a large unexpected withdrawal 
of client deposits, and a sudden outflow of short-term 
capital from the banking sector owing to external factors. 
E. Systemic risk: one scenario based on a matrix of 
relations between banks, testing the failure of one or several 
banks and domino effects. 
-Extreme changes in exchange or interest 
rates should not threaten the stability of the 
banking sector. 
-Credit risk is a problem for individual 
banks, and could be a stability concern 
under the current fast lending growth and 
assuming deterioration in asset quality. 
-The simulated decline in the value of 
government bonds did not have a 
substantial effect on banks. The sudden 
withdrawal of 20% of client deposits had a 
greater effect on large and medium-sized 
banks and of 90% of foreign bank deposits 
on certain medium- sized banks and on 
banks tied in terms of resources to their 
financial groups. 
-The crash of one bank threatens the CAR 
of 2 banks at most, with a spillover 
unlikely. 
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Appendix 2: Policy Responses in Eastern and Western Europe to past or current 
credit growth pressures 
 
The table below summarizes the policy responses that have been used by countries in 
Eastern and Western Europe to respond to past or current credit growth pressures. 
Although it is too early to assess the impact in the countries under study of these 
measures, some early results can be discussed. In several countries, the measures taken 
have so far had little if no impact at all. In Bulgaria, the impact of credit and prudential 
measures was reduced by rapid deposit growth and bank foreign borrowing. In Croatia, 
direct credit controls were not successful in controlling the aggregate demand and the 
current account deficit, with corporations moving to foreign parent bank borrowing, 
leasing and other forms of unsupervised and unregulated financing. Estonia’s credit 
growth remains robust under the impulse of increasing financing from banks abroad. In 
Romania, the measures taken led to a slowdown in local currency credit but a surge in 
foreign exchange denominated credit. 
 
In some other countries, the impact of credit limiting measures was more positive, albeit 
limited. Bosnia’s monetary and regulatory tightening somewhat constrained credit 
expansion. Moldova’s response had small effects as did Serbia’s monetary tightening 
given the high proportion of foreign currency denominated loans. Ukraine experienced a 
slowdown in credit growth, although it remained high. Greece’s tightening had a limited 
effect by the increasingly accommodative monetary conditions in the run-up to the 
monetary union. Portugal credit growth decline was largely affected by higher ECB 
interest rates in 1999 and the 2003 recession (although housing loan growth persisted at 
high levels), and Spain experienced a temporary two year housing credit decline in 2000 
but a resumption thereafter resulting in further dynamic provisioning measures in 2004. 
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Table 5 :Policy responses to rapid credit growth 
Countries  Central Bank Actions 
Bosnia  Tightened bank core capital requirements, Tightened reserve requirements (foreign currency in the 
base, exclusion of vault cash from eligibility), Reduced remuneration of excess reserves at the 
central bank, Tightened foreign exposure regulations, Strengthened application of bank liquidity 
regulations. 
Bulgaria  Tightened fiscal stance, Restricted conditions for current profits to be included in regulatory 
capital, Tightened reserve requirements (by reducing the share of vault cash in eligible assets and 
broadening the liability base subject to RR by including deposits and securities with longer term 
maturity and repos), Introduced marginal reserve requirements for banks exceeding certain rate of 
credit growth, Tightened loan classification and provisioning requirements, Increased the 
frequency and focus of on-site inspections, Strengthened information on retail lending conditions. 
Croatia  Tightened moderately fiscal stance and interest rates, Introduced charges for market risk into 
capital adequacy calculation, Required rapidly growing banks to meet higher capital adequacy 
standards or be subject to mandatory retention of a portion of profits, Introduced banks penalties 
rates for banks with high lending growth, Increased required FX coverage of banks’ FX liabilities, 
Introduced additional reserve requirements for banks with rapidly growing portfolios (with 
exemption if they meet higher capital standards), Introduced marginal reserve requirement on 
foreign borrowing, Introduced monitoring of bank customers’ FX risk during on-site inspections, 
Reorganized CB’s banking supervision department to operate on risk basis, Unified supervision of 
NBFIs. 
Estonia  Increased risk weighting in the capital adequacy calculation of all loans secured by mortgages on 
residential property, Required credit institutions to include half of the total loan amount secured by 
mortgages on residential property in the reserve requirement base calculation (unless the 
appropriate regulator applies a 100% risk weighting in the analogous calculation of capital 
adequacy), Restricted reserve requirements by the inclusion of foreign bank liabilities on gross 
basis and abolishment of vault cash deductibility. Limited mortgage interest deductibility. 
Greece  Imposed non remunerated deposits for an amount equivalent to credit growth above specified rates. 
Increased monitoring of credit management processes and stress testing, public disclosure and 
coordination among supervisory agencies.  
Latvia  Raised reserve requirements, interest rates 
Moldova  Required reserves for FX deposits to be held in FX, Required banks to have separate risk 
management units. 
Poland  Adjusted CAR for foreign exchange risk, Required banks to strengthen risk management and 
internal controls, Credit registry/ wider information base/ APR disclosure requirements. 
Portugal  Tightened rules governing general provisions, large exposures, connected lending and capital 
adequacy. Increased capital requirements for housing loans with loans-to-value ratios exceeding 
75% and tightened provisioning requirements for consumer loans. Strengthened reporting 
requirements relating to risk management, and increased monitoring and coordination among 
supervisory agencies.. 
Romania  Tightened fiscal and monetary stance, Introduced limits on foreign currency credit as percent of 
capital, Increased mandatory reserve requirement on banks’ foreign currency denominated 
liabilities, Extended the reserve base for required reserves on foreign exchange deposits, Lowered 
the reserve ratio on domestic currency deposits, Applied stricter loan classification rules, 
Tightened eligibility for consumer and mortgage loans, Limited insurance companies’ exposure to 
bank loans, Established credit bureau, Postponed liberalization of permitting leu deposits by 
nonresidents. 
Serbia  Increased capital adequacy ratio, Raised reserve requirement for foreign currency deposits, 
Broadened reservable base to include commercial banks’ foreign borrowing, Tightened conditions 
for bank consumer loans, Started regulating and supervising leasing companies. 
Spain  Introduced dynamic provisioning and monitored forward looking indicators related to housing 
credit. 
Ukraine  Raised minimum capital adequacy ratio, Reduced the eligible amount of vault cash in reserve 
requirements, Strengthened loan classification rules, Tightened related-party lending regulations 
were tightened (by set-aside capital), Strengthened bank inspection based on risk assessment, 
Strengthened creditor rights, Established NBFIs regulator. 
Sources: World Bank staff, Central Banks Annual Reports  
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